The US selectively adapted many aspects of the nazi playbook after the war.
One of the key ideas they adapted was the concept of Auftragstaktik which translated into mission command. The US Army used to be very rigid, waiting for orders from the top. The German model relied more on a culture of trusting junior leaders out of necessity, was all about telling a unit what to do as opposed to how to do it. NATO planners were imagining a fast, chaotic war where communications would break down. They baked the idea of decentralized initiative into the 1980s AirLand Battle doctrine. It was about deep strikes and agile counterattacks which is a direct mirror of German Bewegungskrieg.
But here’s a huge opportunity cost. By building the entire US Army around this big tank war in Europe, they let other skills wither on the vine. The army became an instrument for fighting the Soviets and almost useless for anything else. They gutted their own knowledge of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. When Vietnam happened, and later Iraq and Afghanistan, their doctrine proved completely ineffective. All that focus on maneuver warfare meant they deprioritized the human element languages, civil affairs, understanding local politics.
Basically, they took a lot of German ideas on command and deep battle and welded them to American industrial military complex. But the cost was a kind of institutional tunnel vision. They built a rigid army for fighting USSR and were then surprised that it kept failing in messy, smaller wars that their expensive, complex machine wasn’t built to handle.
The US selectively adapted many aspects of the nazi playbook after the war.
One of the key ideas they adapted was the concept of Auftragstaktik which translated into mission command. The US Army used to be very rigid, waiting for orders from the top. The German model relied more on a culture of trusting junior leaders out of necessity, was all about telling a unit what to do as opposed to how to do it. NATO planners were imagining a fast, chaotic war where communications would break down. They baked the idea of decentralized initiative into the 1980s AirLand Battle doctrine. It was about deep strikes and agile counterattacks which is a direct mirror of German Bewegungskrieg.
But here’s a huge opportunity cost. By building the entire US Army around this big tank war in Europe, they let other skills wither on the vine. The army became an instrument for fighting the Soviets and almost useless for anything else. They gutted their own knowledge of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. When Vietnam happened, and later Iraq and Afghanistan, their doctrine proved completely ineffective. All that focus on maneuver warfare meant they deprioritized the human element languages, civil affairs, understanding local politics.
Basically, they took a lot of German ideas on command and deep battle and welded them to American industrial military complex. But the cost was a kind of institutional tunnel vision. They built a rigid army for fighting USSR and were then surprised that it kept failing in messy, smaller wars that their expensive, complex machine wasn’t built to handle.
Thank you - well explained; any book recommendations?
The German Way of War explains Bewegungskrieg influenced western military thinking. Mission Command directly addresses how the US Army adapted German mission command philosophy. The Challenge of Command discusses leadership concepts including German influences on US officer education. Finally, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era directly contrasts American attrition warfare with German maneuver concepts that the US later adopted.
Thank you! (Starred)